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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a novel defensive transfor-
mation that enables us to maintain a high classification accuracy
under the use of both clean images and adversarial examples
for adversarially robust defense. The proposed transformation
is a block-wise preprocessing technique with a secret key to
input images. We developed three algorithms to realize the
proposed transformation: Pixel Shuffling, Bit Flipping, and FFX
Encryption. Experiments were carried out on the CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet datasets by using both black-box and white-box attacks
with various metrics including adaptive ones. The results show
that the proposed defense achieves high accuracy close to that
of using clean images even under adaptive attacks for the first
time. In the best-case scenario, a model trained by using images
transformed by FFX Encryption (block size of 4) yielded an
accuracy of 92.30% on clean images and 91.48% under PGD
attack with a noise distance of 8/255, which is close to the
non-robust accuracy (95.45%) for the CIFAR-10 dataset, and
it yielded an accuracy of 72.18% on clean images and 71.43%
under the same attack, which is also close to the standard
accuracy (73.70%) for the ImageNet dataset. Overall, all three
proposed algorithms are demonstrated to outperform state-of-
the-art defenses including adversarial training whether or not a
model is under attack.
Index Terms—Adversarial Defense, Image Encryption, Image
Classification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although deep neural networks (DNNs) have lead to major
breakthroughs in computer vision, for a wide range of applica-
tions, where safety and security are critical, there is concern
about their reliability. DNNs in general suffer from attacks
such as model inversion attacks [1], membership inference
attacks [2], and adversarial attacks [3]. In particular, carefully
perturbed data points known as adversarial examples are
indistinguishable from clean data points, but they cause DNNs
to make erroneous predictions [3], [4]. As an example, in
Fig. 1, the network here classified the clean image correctly
as “tabby” with a 47.96 % probability. After adding a small
fraction of noise, the network misclassified the tabby cat as
“mosquito net” with 99.99 % confidence. Adversarial exam-
ples create a rising concern where DNNs are to be deployed
in security-critical applications such as autonomous vehicles,
speech recognition, natural language processing, and malware
detection. Therefore, a lot of effort has been put towards
adversarial robustness.
Researchers have proposed numerous ways of constructing
adversarial examples. Such works include [3], [5]–[9], in
which `p-bounded perturbation has been found. In the context
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Fig. 1. Adversarial example.
of computer vision, these threat models do not match real
world applications [10], [11] because there can be various
physical conditions (e.g., camera angle, lighting/weather),
physical limits on imperceptibility, etc. However, it has been
proved that adversarial threats on neural networks remain
real [12]–[16]. In addition, `p-bounded threat models are
crucial for principled deep learning due to their well-defined
nature [17]. They are helpful not only for evaluating the
robustness of deep learning models but also for understanding
them better. It is almost certain that models that are not robust
against `p-bounded attacks will fail in real world scenarios.
With the development of adversarial attacks, numerous
adversarial defenses have been proposed in the literature.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no robust model
that has a similar accuracy to a non-robust one. Some of
the most reliable defenses are certified ones and adversarial
training. However, certified defenses are not scalable, and the
accuracy of adversarial training is not comparable to that of
standard training. Alternatively, researchers have also come up
with preprocessing approaches to improve the classification
accuracy. Unfortunately, most of these approaches are broken
by powerful adaptive attacks [18]. Therefore, finding ways to
achieve high accuracy and adversarial robustness is a growing
concern and an on-going area of research with a high demand
for computer vision because of the wide range of applications.
More importantly, adversarial attacks and defenses have
entered into an arms race in the literature. New defenses are
also broken by performing adaptive attacks [19]. Conventional
adversarial defenses either reduce classification accuracy sig-
nificantly or are completely broken. Therefore, in this work,
we aim to achieve a high classification accuracy not only for
clean examples but also for adversarial ones.
We propose a block-wise defensive transformation with a
secret key that is inspired by perceptual image encryption tech-
niques such as [20]–[26]. Modern deep convolutional neural
networks such as ResNet are known to be sensitive to small
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2image transformation [27]. Therefore, many researchers have
been seeking learnable image encryption methods [22]–[25]
that do not cause big drops in accuracy for privacy-preserving
DNNs, but they have not considered robustness against adver-
sarial examples. Deriving from such encryption methods, we
develop three block-wise transformation algorithms to carry
out the proposed transformation: Pixel Shuffling, Bit Flipping,
and FFX Encryption. The proposed transformation is utilized
to transform training/test images as a preprocessing technique,
and a model is trained/tested by the transformed images. In
addition, we also design adaptive attacks while accounting for
obfuscated gradients [18] to evaluate models trained by the
proposed transformation algorithms. As a result, the models
trained by the proposed transformation make correct predic-
tions for both clean images and adversarial examples. We make
the following contributions in this paper.
• We apply extended perceptual image encryption tech-
niques with a secret key to adversarial defenses for the
first time.
• We develop three block-wise transformation algorithms:
Pixel Shuffling, Bit Flipping, and FFX Encryption.
• We conduct extensive experiments on both black-box and
white-box attacks including adaptive ones and present
empirical results to show the effectiveness of the proposed
defense.
In experiments, the proposed defense is confirmed to outper-
form state-of-the-art adversarial defenses. A part of this work
(Pixel Shuffling) was introduced in [28]. We not only evaluate
Pixel Shuffling under both black-box and white-box attacks
with different metrics, and adaptive attacks with key estimation
approaches but also introduce other novel algorithms in this
paper.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
presents related work on adversarial attacks and defenses.
Section III describes threat models. Regarding the proposed
defense, Section IV includes notations, an overview, the three
proposed block-wise transformation algorithms, the properties
of block-wise transformations with keys, and a discussion
on key management and robustness against adaptive attacks.
Experiments on various attacks including adaptive ones are
presented in Section V, and Section VI concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Adversarial Attacks
The goals of adversarial attacks on neural networks are
confidence reduction, misclassification, and targeted misclas-
sification. The attacks can be divided into two categories:
poisoning/causative attacks (i.e., training time attacks) and
evasion/exploratory attacks (i.e., test time attacks) [29]. Poi-
soning attacks happen during training time, where an adversary
introduces crafted malicious examples into training data to
manipulate the behavior of models. Even one single poisonous
image can compromise a model when transfer learning is
used [30]. Evasion attacks are also called “adversarial exam-
ples,” in which crafted imperceptible perturbations are added.
In this work, we focus on defending against evasion attacks.
Traditionally, evasion attacks are classified into three groups
based on the knowledge of a particular model and training data
available to the adversary: white-box, black-box, and gray-box.
Under white-box settings, the adversary has direct access to the
model, its parameters, training data, and defense mechanism.
However, the adversary does not have any knowledge on the
model, except the output of the model in black-box attacks.
Between white-box and black-box methods, there are gray-box
attacks that imply that the adversary knows something about
the system (i.e., partial knowledge of the model such as its
architecture, parameters, or training data).
Under white-box settings, given an input image x and a
classifier fθ(·) parameterized by θ, an adversarial example x′
is constructed such that fθ(x′) 6= y, where y is a true class.
This is done by minimizing the perturbation δ,
minimize
δ
‖δ‖p , s.t. fθ(x+ δ) 6= y, (1)
or by maximizing the loss function,
maximize
δ∈∆
L(fθ(x+ δ), y). (2)
Usually, a typical threat model is bounded by an `p norm such
that ∆ = {δ : ‖δ‖p ≤ } for some perturbation distance  > 0.
One of the easy and popular ways of generating adversarial
examples is the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [5] under
an `∞ norm with a single gradient step. Its iterative version
is the basic iterative method (BIM) [6]. BIM with multiple
random restarts and initialization with uniform random noise
is recognized as a projected gradient descent (PGD) [9]
adversary. There are other iterative optimization-based attacks
such as the Carlini and Wagner attack (CW) [8] for the `2
bounded metric and the elastic-net attack (EAD) [31] for the
`1 bounded metric. CW finds the smallest noise under the
`2 metric with a new loss function. CW is also a special
case of EAD, where the `1 regularization parameter is set to
zero [31]. In this work, we utilize three state-of-the-art attacks
(PGD, CW, and EAD) to generate different sets of adversarial
examples under `∞, `2, and `1 metrics to evaluate the proposed
defense.
Under black-box settings, the above white-box attacks can
be applied via a substitute model. Several techniques have been
proposed to improve transferability with this type of black-box
attack [32]–[34]. Moreover, there are also gradient-free meth-
ods that estimate gradients such as [35]–[38]. Another recent
black-box attack, NATTACK, learns a probability distribution
centered around the input such that a sample drawn from that
distribution is likely an adversarial example [39]. Additionally,
the OnePixel attack constructs an adversarial example by
modifying one or a few pixels without accessing the weights
of the model with differential evolution [40]. In this work, we
employ the OnePixel attack [40], NATTACK [39], and one
of the gradient estimation attacks, SPSA [37], to evaluate the
proposed defense under black-box settings.
B. Adversarial Defenses
The goal of a defense method is to make a model that
is accurate not only for clean input but also for adversarial
examples. There are many different approaches to achieving
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Fig. 2. Different approaches for adversarial defense.
this goal, such as certified and provable defenses, adversarial
training, preprocessing techniques, and detection algorithms,
as shown in Fig. 2.
Ideally, provable defenses are desired. Inspiring works such
as [41]–[43] proposed provable secure training. Although these
methods are attractive, they are not scalable. Some certified
defenses have been scaled to a certain degree [44]–[47], but the
accuracy is still not comparable to empirically robust models.
Current state-of-the-art empirically robust defenses are un-
der the use of adversarial training. The earliest form of
adversarial training is to inject FGSM-based adversarial noise
into the training data [5]. Since FGSM is not iterative and
not robust against iterative attacks such as PGD, FGSM-based
training was found to be ineffective [6], [9]. Madry et al.
proposed adversarial training with a PGD adversary, achieving
the best empirical robustness to date [9]. However, PGD train-
ing is computationally expensive. To make the computation of
adversarial training more feasible, “free” adversarial training
was proposed in which gradients are computed with respect
to the network parameters and the input image on the same
backward pass [48]. In addition to “free” adversarial training,
“fast” adversarial training was proposed and uses FGSM and
standard efficient training tricks [49]. Although FGSM-based
adversarial training was dismissed before, it is shown to
be effective when random initialization is introduced [49].
Nevertheless, while adversarial training is repeatedly found to
be robust against the best known adversaries [18], the accuracy
is still very low compared with non-robust models.
Another approach to adversarial defenses is the use of
preprocessing techniques. The works that take this direction
utilize various ways of transformation such as thermometer
encoding [50], image processing-based techniques [51], [52],
making small changes to pixels with the intent of removing
adversarial noise [53], and GAN-based transformation [54].
These preprocessing defenses are appealing at first due to their
higher accuracy. However, they have all been broken because
these conventional preprocessing defenses rely on obfuscated
gradients by [18]. Accounting for this problem, Raff et al.
came up with a preprocessing defense that uses a number
of random different transforms with random parameters [55].
Although their work claims majorly improved accuracy on
ImageNet, applying many transforms for each image is compu-
tationally expensive and reduces the accuracy when the model
is not under attack. In addition, one work enforces the use of
1-bit dithered images for training and testing a model [56].
However, typical cameras capture an image in 8-bit, and the
use of 1-bit limits the range of application scenarios.
Moreover, instead of defending against adversarial examples
directly, there are defenses to detect adversarial examples.
Metzen et al. proposed a detection method that trains a binary
classification network to distinguish clean data from adversar-
ial examples [57]. Another work by [58] detects adversarial
examples by looking at the features in the subspace of deep
neural networks. However, it is reported that detection methods
can also be bypassed [59].
All in all, adversarial defense approaches decrease the
classification accuracy of a model. Even worse, most of the de-
fenses, especially preprocessing-based methods, are defeated
due to obfuscated gradients [18] and do not embed a secret key
into the model inference process. Therefore, attaining robust as
well as high accuracy remains an open problem in adversarial
defense research.
In this work, we approach adversarial defense in a different
way by taking inspiration from perceptual image encryption
techniques such as [20], [21], [23]–[25]. Perceptual image
encryption techniques have never been applied before in this
line of work. Similar to our work (Pixel Shuffling), Taran et al.
first introduced a pixel shuffling approach (pixel-wise manner)
with a secret key by using a standard random permutation [60].
Although their method [60] was effective to defend against
adversarial examples, it was tested only on small datasets
(MNIST [61] and F-MNIST [62]) and clean accuracy is
significantly dropped on larger datasets such as CIFAR-10 [63]
and ImageNet [64]. The reason is that shuffling in a pixel-
wise manner loses spatial perceptual information. In contrast,
the proposed algorithm (Pixel Shuffling) is block-wise pixel
shuffling and designed to maintain a high clean accuracy.
In this paper, we will show that the extension of perceptual
image encryption techniques is effective in defending against
adversarial examples.
III. THREAT MODELS
The goal of an adversarial defense is to keep the classifi-
cation accuracy on both clean images and adversarial exam-
ples high. To evaluate a defense method, precisely defining
threat models is necessary. A threat model includes a set of
assumptions such as an adversary’s goals, knowledge, and
capabilities [17]. We also define attack scenarios considering
practical applications.
A. Adversary’s Goals
An adversary can construct adversarial examples to achieve
different goals when attacking a model: whether to reduce the
performance accuracy (i.e., untargeted attacks) or to classify
a targeted class (i.e., targeted attacks). Formally, untargeted
attacks will cause a classifier fθ to misclassify a true class
ytrue, given an adversarial example x′ (i.e., fθ(x′) 6= ytrue),
and targeted ones will force the classifier to a targeted label
4(i.e., fθ(x′) = ytargeted). In this paper, we focus on untargeted
attacks, although targeted attacks can be launched in a similar
fashion.
B. Adversary’s Knowledge
According to [17], the adversary’s knowledge can be white-
box (inner workings of the defense mechanism, complete
knowledge on the model and its parameters), black-box (no
knowledge on the model) and gray-box, that is, anything in
between white-box and black-box. As in the field of cryp-
tography, there can be a small amount of secret information
even in white-box settings if the secret information must be
easily replaceable and non-extractable [17]. For our proposed
defense, we introduce a secret key with a transparent algorithm
for the first time. The secret key can be replaced by retraining
the model, and it cannot be extracted from the training data
nor the model. The key is utilized to preprocess input on the
fly just before the input goes into the model. In this work, we
consider both white-box and black-box attacks while keeping
a secret key.
C. Adversary’s Capabilities
Depending on the requirements of different applications, a
secret key may or may not be required for inference. However,
it should be securely stored or distributed. We assume the
adversary does not have access to information with respect
to the secret key (either the key itself or model output with
respect to the correct secret key). However, the adversary may
guess/estimate the secret key and observe the model. Then,
they can perform untargeted attacks in which small changes
are made under different metrics (`0, `1, `2, `∞) that change
the true class of the input.
D. Attack Scenarios
We consider the following practical application scenarios.
Black-box: The attacker queries the protected model with
their key and observes the output of the model. Specifi-
cally, the attacker performs three powerful black-box attacks:
OnePixel [39], NATTACK [40], and SPSA [37].
White-box: In the proposed defense, the key is not a part of
the model parameters. The model may be stolen in the case of
sharing the model. We assume a scenario in which the model
weights and the defense algorithm are available to the attacker.
Since the defense algorithm is known, the attacker may carry
out white-box attacks with their key. Specifically, the attacker
carries out three strong white-box attacks: PGD [9], CW [8],
and EAD [31]. To make the attacks more successful, we
assume the attacker incorporates the defense algorithm with
an unknown key during the attacks. In other words, the white-
box attacks are run on top of the defense algorithm with the
attacker’s key.
IV. PROPOSED DEFENSE
Image classification is the task of classifying an input
image into a class category according to its visual content.
The proposed defense targets robust predictions in the image
classification task, which is a core problem in computer vision.
A. Notation
The following notations are utilized throughout this paper.
• w, h, and c are used to denote the width, height, and the
number of channels of an image.
• The tensor x ∈ [0, 1]c×w×h represents an input color
image.
• δ denotes adversarial noise.
• δa denotes adaptive adversarial noise.
• The tensor xt ∈ [0, 1]c×w×h represents a transformed
image.
• M is the block size of an image.
• Tensors xb, x′b ∈ [0, 1]wb×hb×pb are a block image and
a transformed block image, respectively, where wb = wM
is the number of blocks across width w, hb = hbM is the
number of blocks across height h, and pb = M ×M × c
is the number of pixels in a block.
• A pixel value in a block image (xb or x′b) is denoted
by xb(i, j, k) or x′b(i, j, k), where i ∈ {0, . . . , wb − 1},
j ∈ {0, . . . , hb − 1}, and k ∈ {0, . . . , pb − 1} are indices
corresponding to the dimension of xb or x′b.
• B is a block of an image, and its dimension is M×M×c.
• Bˆ is a flattened version of block B, and its dimension is
1× 1× pb.
• An encryption key is denoted by K.
• A password required for format-preserving encryption,
which refers to encrypting in such a way that the output
is in the same format as its input, is denoted as P .
• Enc(n, P ) denotes format-preserving Feistel-based en-
cryption (FFX) [65] with a length of 3, where n is an
integer (used only in FFX Encryption).
• A classifier with parameters θ is denoted as fθ(·).
B. Overview
We propose a general key-based adversarial defense that
satisfies two requirements: defending against adversarial ex-
amples and maintaining a high classification accuracy. As-
suming the key stays secret, an attacker will not obtain
any useful information on the model, which will render the
adversarial attack ineffective. The main idea of the proposed
method is to embed a secret key into the model structure with
minimal impact on model performance. To maintain a high
classification accuracy, the proposed defense is designed in
such a way that each block position in an input image is not
changed.
Based on different types of key management, the proposed
defense can be applied in two scenarios as shown in Fig. 3:
(1) Scenario A, where key K is saved with a provider, and
(2) Scenario B, where key K is required by a provider for
inference. As an example, Scenario A can be deployed in
self-driving cars, and Scenario B can be utilized in vision
application programming interfaces (APIs).
The proposed defense is a preprocessing technique that
transforms an input image with a secret key in a block-wise
manner. Both training and testing images are transformed
with a secret key prior to training or testing by the provider.
Generally, there are three parts to the proposed defensive trans-
formation: block segmentation, block-wise transformation, and
5block integration (see Fig. 4). The process of the proposed
transformation is shown as follows.
1) Block Segmentation: The process of block segmentation
is illustrated in Fig. 5.
• An input image x is divided into blocks such that
{B11, B12, . . . , Bwbhb}.
• Each block in x is flattened to obtain
{Bˆ11, Bˆ12, . . . , Bˆwbhb}.
• The flattened blocks are concatenated in such a way
that the relative spatial location among blocks in xb is
the same as that among blocks in x.
2) Block-wise Transformation Given a secret key K that
is a seed for generating a pseudo random integer vector
with a size of pb, xb is transformed by using a block-
wise transformation algorithm, t(xb,K). The transformed
block image is written as
x′b = t(xb,K). (3)
3) Block Integration The transformed blocks in x′b are
integrated back to the original dimension (i.e., c×w×h)
in the reverse order to the block segmentation process for
obtaining a transformed image xt.
C. Three Proposed Block-wise Transformations
We propose three block-wise transformation algorithms,
Pixel Shuffling, Bit Flipping, and FFX Encryption, for re-
alizing t(xb,K). A block-wise transformation takes a block
image xb and a key K and then outputs a transformed
block image x′b. In the case of FFX Encryption, there is
an additional parameter, password P , for format-preserving
encryption. Although one of the three algorithms (Pixel Shuf-
fling) was discussed in our previous work [28], we extend
the evaluation of Pixel Shuffling with various white-box and
black-box attacks under different metrics and adaptive attacks
with key estimation in this paper.
Pixel Shuffling: There are two steps to pixel shuffling as
described in Algorithm 1:
1) Generate a random permutation vector v =
(v0, v1, . . . , vk, . . . , vk′ , . . . , vpb−1) that consists of
randomly permuted integers from 0 to pb − 1 by using
key K. Let k, k′ ∈ {0, . . . , pb − 1} and vk 6= vk′ if
k 6= k′.
2) Perform block-wise shuffling on the basis of v. Basically,
positions of pixel values in each block are changed on the
basis of v, i.e.,
x′b(i, j, vk) = xb(i, j, k). (4)
Algorithm 1 Pixel Shuffling
Input: xb,K
Output: x′b
Generate a random permutation vector v by K
x′b ← xb[:, :, v]
Bit Flipping: There are four steps to pixel intensity inver-
sion as described in Algorithm 2:
1) Generate a random binary vector r =
(r0, r1, . . . , rk, . . . , rpb−1), rk ∈ {0, 1} by using
key K. To keep the transformation consistent, r is
distributed with 50 % of “0”s and 50 % of “1”s.
2) Convert every pixel value to be in 255 scale with 8 bits
(i.e., multiply xb by 255).
3) Perform block-wise negative/positive transformation on
the basis of r. Basically, every pixel value in block Bˆij
is applied to
x′b(i, j, k) =
{
xb(i, j, k) (rk = 0)
xb(i, j, k)⊕ (2L − 1) (rk = 1), (5)
where L is the number of bits used in xb(i, j, k), and
L = 8 is used in this paper.
4) Convert every pixel value back to [0, 1] scale (i.e., divide
x′b by 255).
Algorithm 2 Bit Flipping
Input: xb, K
Output: x′b
Generate a random binary vector r by K
// Make pixel values be at 255 scale
xb ← xb · 255
x′b[:, :, r]← 255− xb[:, :, r]
x′b ← x′b/255
FFX Encryption: In Bit Flipping, there are only two
possibilities: whether the intensity of a pixel value is inversed
or not. In contrast, we replace Bit Flipping with a crypto-
graphic property (i.e., FFX mode) to generate a unique pattern
in a block-wise manner, where the number of patterns is
much larger than that of Bit Flipping. For this reason, FFX
Encryption is applied to adversarial defense for the first time.
Apart from key K, FFX-based transformation also requires
a password P for format-preserving Feistel-based encryption
(FFX) [65]. The pixel value xb(i, j, k) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 254, 255}
is encrypted by FFX with a length of 3 digits to cover the
whole range from 0 to 255. FFX randomly transforms each
pixel with an integer value of (0–255) into a pixel with an
integer value of (0–999) preserving the integer format. There
are four steps to FFX-based transformation as described in
Algorithm 3:
1) Generate a random binary vector r =
(r0, r1, . . . , rk, . . . , rpb−1), rk ∈ {0, 1} by using
key K. To keep the transformation consistent, r is
distributed with 50 % of “0”s and 50 % of “1”s.
2) Convert every pixel value to be at 255 scale with 8 bits
(i.e., multiply xb by 255).
3) Perform block-wise FFX-based transformation on the
basis of r and P . Basically, every pixel value in block
Bˆij is applied to
x′b(i, j, k) =
{
xb(i, j, k) (rk = 0)
Enc(xb(i, j, k), P ) (rk = 1).
(6)
4) Convert every pixel value back to [0, 1] scale (i.e., divide
x′b by the maximum value of x
′
b).
On a side note, only pixel values of 0 to 255 are encrypted
once, and the block-wise transformation uses a lookup table.
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Therefore, the computational cost of encrypting 256 integer
values in FFX mode is negligible and does not cause any
significant overheads when training or testing a model.
D. Properties of Block-wise Transformation with Key
A classifier model, fθ(·), trained by using transformed
images is affected by both key K and the block-wise trans-
formation used for transforming images. Each transformation
algorithm creates a unique pattern as illustrated in Fig. 6,
where a test image (“horse”) was transformed by the three
Algorithm 3 FFX Encryption
Input: xb, K, P
Output: x′b
Generate a random binary vector r by K
// Make pixel values be at 255 scale
xb ← xb · 255
x′b[:, :, r]← Enc(xb[:, :, r], P )
max ← the maximum value of the encryption
x′b ← x′b/max
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Fig. 6. Example of images generated by three proposed transformations with
M = 2. (a) Original image. (b) Pixel Shuffling. (c) Bit Flipping. (d) FFX
Encryption.
proposed algorithms. The pattern created by the defensive
transformation makes the gradients of the loss function with
respect to the parameters unique to the particular transforma-
tion and the key, i.e.,
∇θL(fθ(xt), y) 6≈ ∇θL(fθ(x), y), (7)
and
∇θL(fθ(t(xb,K1)), y) 6≈ ∇θL(fθ(t(xb,K2)), y), (8)
where K1 and K2 are different keys, and the symbol 6≈ denotes
approximately not equal to. Consequently, a model trained
by the transformed images works well only when images are
transformed under the use of the same transformation and key
as those used for training the model. Therefore, the equations
fθ(xt) 6= fθ(x) (9)
and
fθ(t(xb),K1) 6= fθ(t(xb),K2) (10)
are satisfied.
Another notable property of the proposed defense is the
low computation cost. The block-wise operation utilized in the
proposed defense can be efficiently implemented by vectorized
operations and is available for large-scale systems without
any noticeable overheads during training/inference. Therefore,
the proposed defense has potential for real-world applications
including real-time ones.
E. Key Management and Robustness Against Adaptive Attacks
One of the properties of the proposed transformation is the
use of a secret key. The key can be saved with a provider or
can be required by the provider as a parameter for inference
as shown in Fig. 3. Key management and robustness against
adaptive attacks are discussed here to evaluate the effectiveness
of the proposed defense.
As pointed out in [17], [19], adaptive attacks, which are
adapted to the specific details of the proposed defense, are
necessary in evaluating adversarial defenses to avoid a false
sense of security. Optimization-based attack methods require
correct gradients of the loss function with respect to the input.
Therefore, many defenses make the gradients incorrect by
introducing non-differentiable transformation or other obfusca-
tion means such as randomization. These defenses that rely on
obfuscated gradients are defeated by adaptive attacks [18]. One
of the reasons adaptive attacks are successful is that useful gra-
dients can be approximated because defensively transformed
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Fig. 7. Scenario of adaptive attack with estimated key.
input is similar to the original input (i.e., g(x) ≈ x, where g(·)
is a defensive transform). In contrast, in the proposed defense,
the input is transformed in a systematic way with a secret key,
and the resulting input is not similar to the initial input (i.e.,
t(x,K) 6≈ x).
We carry out the following adaptive attacks to evaluate the
proposed defense. In experiments, the proposed defense will
be demonstrated to still maintain robustness against adaptive
attacks.
1) Inverse Transformation Attack: An adversary may gen-
erate adversarial examples by adding noise to transformed
images and inverse transform them with an assumed key. To
simulate such an attack scenario, we designed an adaptive
attack as shown in Fig. 7. Since key K is not available to the
adversary, it has to be guessed randomly or heuristically for the
adversary to carry out the adaptive attack. When an estimated
key is close enough to the correct key, the adversary may be
able to fool the model. However, we show that searching for
a key close to key K is not easy.
2) Estimation over Transformation Attack: The Estimation
over Transformation Attack (EOT) is effective for estimating
gradients in adversarial defenses with randomization as ex-
plained in [18]. Instead of taking one step in the direction of
gradients ∇xf(x), we move in the direction of
∑30
i=1∇xf(x).
In other words, we use 30 keys to generate adversarial exam-
ples under a PGD attack.
3) Transferability Attack: Since the proposed defensive
transformation method is transparent, an attacker can train a
substitute model with their key. Then, the attacker generates
adversarial examples over the substitute model. We simulate
this attack scenario in experiments.
V. EXPERIMENTS
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed defense, we
ran a number of experiments on different datasets. All the
experiments were carried out in PyTorch platform.
A. Datasets
We used the CIFAR-10 [63] and ImageNet [64] datasets.
CIFAR-10 consists of 60,000 color images (dimension of
32 × 32 × 3) with 10 classes (6000 images for each class)
where 50,000 images are for training and 10,000 for testing.
We utilized a batch size of 128 and live augmentation (random
cropping with a padding of 4 and random horizontal flip) on
a training set.
ImageNet comprises 1.28 million color images for training
and 50,000 color images for validation. We progressively
8resized images during training starting with larger batches
of smaller images to smaller batches of larger images. We
adapted three phases of training from the DAWNBench top
submissions as mentioned in [49]. Phases 1 and 2 resized
images to 160 and 352 pixels, respectively, and phase 3 used
the entire image size from the training set. The augmentation
methods used in the experiment were random resizing and
cropping (sizes of 128, 224, and 288 respectively for each
phase) and random horizontal flip.
B. Networks
We utilized deep residual networks [66] with 18 layers
(ResNet18) for the CIFAR-10 dataset and trained for 200
epochs with efficient training techniques from the DAWN-
Bench top submissions: cyclic learning rates [67] and mixed-
precision training [68]. The parameters of the stochastic gradi-
ent descent (SGD) optimizer were a momentum of 0.9, weight
decay of 0.0005, and maximum learning rate of 0.2. For
ImageNet, we used ResNet50 with pre-trained weights. We
adapted the training settings from [49] with the removal of
weight decay regularization from batch normalization layers.
The network was trained for 15 epochs in total for the
ImageNet dataset.
C. Attack Settings
We utilized an attack library [69] for SPSA, PGD, CW,
and EAD attacks, a publicly available implementation of
the OnePixel attack, and code from the original authors for
NATTACK.
Three black-box attacks, OnePixel, NATTACK, and SPSA,
were deployed to evaluate the proposed defense. The OnePixel
attack was configured for 10 pixels, 100 iterations, and a
population size of 400. For NATTACK, the population size
was 300, the sigma was 0.1, the learning rate was 0.02, and 500
iterations were used for the CIFAR-10 dataset, and population
sizes of 200 and 200 iterations were used for the ImageNet
dataset. SPSA was set up with a delta value of 0.01, a learning
rate of 0.01, a batch size of 256, and 100 maximum iterations
for CIFAR-10 and a batch size of 128 for ImageNet.
Three white-box attacks, PGD, CW, and EAD, were used to
attack the proposed defense. The PGD attack was configured
with a step size of 2/255, 50 iterations, and random initializa-
tion. Since we focused on untargeted attacks, CW and EAD
were configured with a confidence value of 0, learning rate
of 0.01, binary search steps of 9, and an initial constant of
0.001 for 1000 iterations for CIFAR-10 and 100 iterations for
ImageNet. EAD was set up with the elastic-net (EN) decision
rule.
D. Evaluation Metrics
We used two metrics: accuracy (ACC) and attack success
rate (ASR). ACC is given by
ACC =
{
1
N
∑N
i=1 1(fθ(xi) = yi) (clean)
1
N
∑N
i=1 1(fθ(xi + δi) = yi) (attacked),
(11)
and ASR is defined as
ASR =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1(fθ(xi) = yi ∧ fθ(xi + δi) 6= yi), (12)
where N is the number of test images, 1(condition) is one
if condition is true, otherwise zero, {xi, yi} is a test image
(xi) with its corresponding label (yi), and δi is its respective
adversarial noise depending on a specific attack.
E. Robustness Against Black-box and White-box Attacks
A noise distance  value of 8/255 was used in `∞-bounded
attacks. Table I captures the performance of both the base-
line model (standard) and the proposed defense models for
different block sizes (M ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16}) in terms of clean
ACC and ASR. ACC was calculated for the whole test set
(10,000 images for CIFAR-10 and 50,000 for ImageNet), and
we computed ASR for 1,000 randomly selected images that
were correctly classified by the proposed defense models. The
models are denoted by their defense method and block size.
For example, a model trained by using Pixel Shuffling with a
block size of M = 2 is indicated as “Pixel Shuffling (M = 2).”
From Table I, the results are summarized as follows.
1) CIFAR-10:
• Standard: Although the baseline (non-protected) model
achieved the highest accuracy, it was most vulnerable to
all attacks.
• Pixel Shuffling: The model with M = 2 provided a clean
ACC of 94.45 %, and the worst case ASR was 11.30 %
with SPSA. The model with M = 16 reduced the clean
ACC to 76.22 although the ASRs for all attacks were low.
Overall, the model with M = 4 performed reasonably
well whether or not it was under attack.
• Bit Flipping: The ACC of the model with M = 2 was
very close to that of the standard model (i.e., 95.32 %).
However, the ASR was more than 10 % for OnePixel and
SPSA attacks. The models with M = 8 and 16 were
broken as the ASR was high. For Bit Flipping, the model
with M = 4 achieved the overall best accuracy.
• FFX Encryption: Although the ACCs of the models
with FFX Encryption were slightly lower, they had bet-
ter resistance against all of the attacks. Again, for the
FFX Encryption defensive transformation, the model with
M = 4 performed better overall.
In summary, a bigger block size reduced the classification
accuracy for Pixel Shuffling and increased the ASR for Bit
Flipping. However, for FFX Encryption, although the clean
ACC was slightly lower, it provided better defense throughout
the attacks (i.e., a lower ASR) for all different block sizes. Our
experiments suggest that M = 4 is the optimal parameter for
all three proposed defensive transformations. In addition, we
plotted the ASR against noise distance  (maximum of 32/255)
for the whole test set under PGD attack in Fig. 8. The ASR
for all three transformations increased with respect to bigger 
values. FFX Encryption had a lower ASR throughout all noise
levels, and Bit Flipping had a very high ASR for M = 8 and
16.
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Fig. 8. ASR of proposed defense against PGD attack for CIFAR-10 dataset. ASR was calculated over 10,000 images (whole test set).
2) ImageNet: Since M = 4 provided overall better results,
we used M = 4 for the ImageNet dataset.
• Standard: Similarly, the standard model achieved the
highest clean accuracy and ASR for all attacks.
• Pixel Shuffling: The ASRs of SPSA and PGD were
6.26 % and 5.69 %, respectively, and those of the other
attacks were very low.
• Bit Flipping: Similarly, the ASRs of SPSA and PGD for
Bit Flipping were 6.16 % and 6.56 %, respectively, and
those of the other attacks were very low.
• FFX Encryption: The results show that FFX Encryption
provided a lower ASR compared with Pixel Shuffling and
Bit Flipping for SPSA and PGD attacks (i.e., 5.77 % and
3.77 % respectively). The ASRs of the other attacks were
also very low.
Notably, the proposed defense achieved almost the same
clean accuracy as the standard one (i.e., ≈72 %), and the
ASR was lower than 7 % for all cases. Figure 9 shows the
performance of the proposed defense with the PGD attack
under different noise distances. For the worst-case scenario
(i.e.,  = 32/255), the ASRs for Pixel Shuffling and Bit
Flipping were approximately 28 % and 25 %, respectively. In
contrast, the ASR of FFX Encryption was less than 20 %.
F. Comparison with State-of-the-art Defenses
First, we compared the accuracy of the proposed defense
among the three key-based transformations with different
block sizes under PGD attack for the CIFAR-10 dataset.
Graphs of accuracy versus perturbation budget  are shown
in Fig. 10. When  = 8/255, the model with FFX Encryption
(M = 2) achieved the highest accuracy (93.01 %). As for the
worst case  (i.e., 32/255), the model with FFX Encryption
(M = 16) yielded 76.74 %. Notably, Bit Flipping for M = 8
and 16 reduced the accuracy significantly even for small 
values. However, the models with M = 4 provided the overall
best accuracy, especially for an  value of 8/255 for all three
transformations. Therefore, we used the models with M = 4 as
representatives for comparison with state-of-the-art defenses.
Most preprocessing-based defenses such as [50]–[54] were
defeated by adaptive attacks due to obfuscated gradients [18].
Even the most recent state-of-the-art defenses were invali-
dated by rigorous adaptive attacks [19]. To the best of our
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Fig. 9. ASR of proposed defense against PGD attack for ImageNet dataset.
ASR was calculated over 10,000 images randomly selected from validation
set.
knowledge, only adversarial training (AT) is repeatedly found
effective to defend against adversarial examples. However, AT
has been known to be extremely difficult at the ImageNet scale
due to the high computation cost [6]. Recently, “Fast” AT was
proposed to overcome such difficulty [49]. We compared the
proposed defense models with the latest efficient AT (i.e., Fast
AT) [49] as a baseline defense, a recent feature scattering-
based approach (FS) [70], and another key-based defense
using standard random permutation (SRP) [60] in terms of
accuracy, whether or not the model was under PGD attack
with various perturbation budgets. We exclude defenses that
are already broken or that have a very low clean accuracy from
comparison.
1) CIFAR-10: Figure 11 shows the performance of the
proposed defense models with M = 4 compared with Fast
AT [49], FS [70], and SRP [60]. In terms of clean accuracy,
the model with Bit Flipping (M = 4) achieved the highest
accuracy (i.e., 93.41 %), while Fast AT was 83.80 %, FS was
89.98 %, and SRP was 65.16 %. When the noise distance was
8/255, the model with FFX Encryption (M = 4) outperformed
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TABLE I
CLEAN ACCURACY (ACC) (%) AND ATTACK SUCCESS RATE (ASR) (%) OF STANDARD AND PROPOSED DEFENSE MODELS UNDER DIFFERENT ATTACKS
WHERE  = 8/255 FOR `∞ METRIC
CIFAR-10
Clean ACC ASR (Black-box) ASR (White-box)
Model Standard Protected OnePixel (`0) NATTACK (`∞) SPSA (`∞) PGD (`∞) CW (`2) EAD (`1)
Standard 95.45 – 79.90 99.90 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Pixel Shuffling (M = 2)
–
94.45 9.50 0.80 11.30 9.80 0.00 0.09
Pixel Shuffling (M = 4) 91.84 5.00 0.20 3.00 3.30 0.00 0.00
Pixel Shuffling (M = 8) 85.12 3.90 0.00 3.60 4.00 0.09 0.19
Pixel Shuffling (M = 16) 76.22 2.80 0.20 3.37 3.42 0.00 0.00
Bit Flipping (M = 2)
–
95.32 10.50 0.70 10.25 9.62 0.00 0.18
Bit Flipping (M = 4) 93.41 5.30 0.20 4.29 4.64 0.00 0.09
Bit Flipping (M = 8) 91.54 21.40 32.50 88.14 84.34 2.26 3.11
Bit Flipping (M = 16) 92.68 27.10 71.80 98.24 98.98 5.40 8.75
FFX Encryption (M = 2)
–
93.67 6.30 1.90 2.46 1.77 0.47 0.00
FFX Encryption (M = 4) 92.30 3.90 2.10 2.45 1.96 0.28 0.00
FFX Encryption (M = 8) 91.99 2.00 4.20 3.57 1.41 0.00 0.00
FFX Encryption (M = 16) 91.38 3.20 6.30 6.62 1.60 0.28 0.00
ImageNet
Clean ACC ASR (Black-box) ASR (White-box)
Model Standard Protected OnePixel (`0) NATTACK (`∞) SPSA (`∞) PGD (`∞) CW (`2) EAD (`1)
Standard 73.70 – 13.30 97.80 99.60 100.00 100.00 100.00
Pixel Shuffling (M = 4) – 72.41 1.90 0.40 6.26 5.69 0.10 0.10
Bit Flipping (M = 4) – 72.63 1.20 0.00 6.16 6.56 0.00 0.00
FFX Encryption (M = 4) – 72.18 0.70 0.60 5.77 3.77 0.90 0.00
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Fig. 10. ACC of proposed defense against PGD attack for CIFAR-10 dataset. ACC was calculated over 10,000 images (whole test set).
all of the methods, achieving 91.48 % compared with Fast
AT (46.44 %), FS (69.35 %), and SRP (62.63 %). When the
perturbation budget was increased to 32/255, the model with
FFX Encryption (M = 4) still provided the highest accuracy
(64.86 %). Overall, all of the models with the proposed trans-
formations outperformed state-of-the-art defenses at any given
perturbation budget.
2) ImageNet: In a similar fashion, we conducted the PGD
attack with different perturbation budgets to confirm the effec-
tiveness of the proposed defense. The accuracy of SRP [60]
11
0 10 20 30
Epsilon ( /255)
0
20
40
60
80
100
A
C
C
 (%
)
FFX Encryption (M = 4)
Bit Flipping (M = 4)
Pixel Shuffling (M = 4)
Fast AT [49]
SRP [60]
Feature Scattering [70]
Fig. 11. Comparison of proposed defense with state-of-the-art defenses in
terms of ACC under PGD attack for CIFAR-10 dataset. ACC was calculated
over 10,000 images (whole test set).
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Fig. 12. Comparison of proposed defense with state-of-the-art defenses in
terms of ACC under PGD attack for ImageNet dataset. ACC was calculated
over 50,000 images (whole validation set).
for ImageNet was 9.99 %; therefore, we excluded SRP from
comparison. Moreover, FS [70] is not available for the Ima-
geNet dataset. Therefore, we compared the proposed defense
with the Fast AT [49] released by the original authors, which
was trained with an  value of 4/255. Figure 12 shows the
performance comparison under the PGD attack with different
 values in terms of ACC. The model with FFX Encryption
outperformed all other methods for any given perturbation
budget. In the literature, there is no defense that can maintain
clean accuracy close to the standard one at the ImageNet scale.
We are the first to achieve the closest clean accuracy as well
as a high accuracy under the attacks even on the ImageNet
dataset.
G. Robustness Against Adaptive Attacks
Without the correct key or a near-correct key, conventional
attacks will not work on the proposed defense with a secret
key. Therefore, we assume an attacker may estimate the correct
key K randomly or heuristically. Once K was estimated, we
ran the PGD attack by using the estimated key K ′ since PGD
is one of the strongest adversaries, and the proposed defense
was confirmed effective when the key was correct. Apart from
key estimation methods, we also deployed the adaptive attacks
described in IV-E to evaluate the proposed defense.
1) Random Key Estimation Approach: One of the ways of
estimating key K is to randomly search for a key. As in black-
box settings, the attacker may query the model with their key.
We allow the attacker to query the model for a maximum of
20,000 queries. In other words, the attacker uses a single image
and a key K ′ at a time to query the model. When the model
makes the correct prediction for the test image with respect to
the key K ′, the attacker stops the random search and uses K ′
to generate adversarial examples. While considering the worst-
case scenario, we also assume the attacker has the weights of
the model (white-box) and can use a batch of images to test
a key K ′ over the average accuracy.
The key space can be varied depending on the number of
pixels in a block pb. The key space of Pixel Shuffling is given
by
Kshuffling(pb) = pb!. (13)
For Bit Flipping and FFX Encryption, 50 % of the pixels in
each block are inversed/encrypted, and the key controls which
pixels are inversed/encrypted. Therefore, their key spaces are
the same and written as
Kflipping/encryption(pb) =
(
pb
pb
2
)
=
pb!
(pb/2)! · (pb/2)! . (14)
2) Heuristic Key Estimation Approach: As in white-box
settings, we assume the attacker knows the model weights
and inner workings of the defense algorithm. In this case,
instead of trying a key randomly, key K may be estimated
by using a heuristic approach. In other words, K is not
directly estimated, but the transformation pattern caused by K
is estimated. A key is used to generate a random permutation
vector v = (v0, v1, . . . , vpb−1) for Pixel Shuffling and a
random binary vector r = (r0, r1, . . . , rpb−1) for Bit Flipping
and FFX Encryption. Therefore, the adversary can modify v
or r by using the average accuracy over a batch of images
as a guide to carry out an adaptive attack as follows (see
Algorithm 4).
1) Initialize a permutation vector v (for Pixel Shuffling) or
a binary vector r (for Bit Flipping/FFX Encryption) with
a random key K ′.
2) Calculate the accuracy of the model over a batch of
images.
3) Repeatedly swap two values in v: vi and vj (for Pixel
Shuffling) or in r: ri and rj (for Bit Flipping/FFX
Encryption) for T rounds if the accuracy improves.
4) Return the tuned v (for Pixel Shuffling) or r (for Bit
Flipping/FFX Encryption) to proceed with the adaptive
attack.
We implemented the key search approaches on the CIFAR-
10 dataset with a batch size of 128 and parameter T = 10.
A note on FFX Encryption is that password P does not
matter since the length of FFX encryption is fixed (i.e., 3).
Therefore, the attacker can assume any password during the
attack. Table II summarizes the results of the key search
attacks. In all transformations, random key search approaches
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Algorithm 4 Heuristic Key Estimation Approach
Input: A batch of images
Output: v or r
Initialize v or r with a random key K ′
accuracy ← Calculate the accuracy of the model
for t← 1 . . . T do
for i← 0, . . . , pb − 1 do
for j ← i+ 1, . . . , pb − 1 do
if accuracy improves then
Swap vi and vj for Pixel Shuffling
or
Swap ri and rj for Bit Flipping/FFX Encryption
end if
end for
end for
end for
(either by a single image or batch of images) did not guarantee
that a close-enough key was found since ASR was very low.
For the heuristic approach, ASR was 77.76 % for Bit Flipping
(M = 4), 3.70 % for Pixel Shuffling (M = 4), and 3.27 %
for FFX Encryption (M = 4). Although the ASR for Bit
Flipping was high, this type of attack is only possible when
the model weights are available to the attacker. However, Pixel
Shuffling and FFX Encryption were still resistant to such
attacks. Moreover, one key belongs to one model only and,
therefore, the attacker cannot generalize the attack.
3) Inverse Transformation Attack: In Fig. 13, examples of
adversarial and adaptive adversarial examples are illustrated
under the PGD attack for each algorithm, where key K was
estimated by using the heuristic approach (see Algorithm 4)
with T = 10. For FFX Encryption, the visibility of the
adaptive adversarial example was heavily changed compared
with Pixel Shuffling and Bit Flipping. In other words, the
perturbations were clearly perceptive, and valid adversarial
examples were not found under this type of attack for FFX
Encryption. Therefore, we do not report the result of this
adaptive attack for FFX Encryption in Table II. Since the
estimated key was not good enough, the ASR was still very
low for both Pixel Shuffling and Bit Flipping.
4) Estimation over Transformation Attack: The results for
the EOT attack are summarized in Table II. From the exper-
iments, the ASR was also very low (less than 2 %) for Pixel
Shuffling and Bit Flipping and ≈5 % for FFX Encryption.
Therefore, the proposed defense was still resistant against such
adversarial examples.
5) Transferability Attack: We simulated this attack sce-
nario, and the results are presented in Table II. The ASR was
5.07 % for Pixel Shuffling, 1.49 % for Bit Flipping, and 6.41 %
for FFX Encryption. The results suggest that the proposed
method can still defend against adversarial examples under
this type of attack.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel block-wise image trans-
formation as a preprocessing defense method, where both input
images and test ones are preprocessed by using the proposed
transformation with a key. To realize the proposed transfor-
mation, we developed three algorithms: Pixel Shuffling, Bit
Flipping, and FFX Encryption. The results showed that the
proposed defense was robust against conventional threat mod-
els under various metrics (`∞, `2, `1, `0), achieving more than
90 % accuracy for both clean images and adversarial examples.
In addition, we also conducted various adaptive attacks to
further evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed defense.
Under PGD attack with different perturbation budgets, the
proposed defense outperformed the state-of-the art adversarial
defenses with the CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets. Moreover,
the proposed defense was confirmed to bring robust accuracy
close to non-robust accuracy for both the CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet datasets for the first time.
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